The
swift downfall of dictators in Egypt and Tunisia sparked neighbouring countries
to emulate the Arab Spring regime change. Consequently, Syria’s 2011 peaceful
protests met with the brutal crackdown of the Assad regime which is considered
as the genesis of the Syrian civil war. However, the dynamic of the crisis is
further complicated by external actors and ideological as well as geographical
diagrams. In this body of discussion, there is an attempt to resolve the crisis
and convene a viable peace process.
The
crisis heavily impacts human rights as it births heinous crimes, terrorist
acts, oppression, torture, deception, manipulations, targeted misinformation,
casualties, displacement and intentional humiliation (Weaver, 2013). This also
has spill over effect impacting beyond national borders into the most
vulnerable neighbouring country through porous borders, Lebanon and its sunni
and shia political factions (Mather, 2013).
These
are costs of revolutionary aspirations in overthrowing an oppressive
government. The observable revolutionary trends have three distinct stages
which are politicize, radicalize and militarize (Khashanah, 2014). The basic
and common ingredients that induce revolt are poverty, illiteracy, injustice,
corruption and tyranny. In the case of Syria, the uprising is due to discontent
that begun with poor climatic conditions, drought, high crude oil prices, food
shortages, high unemployment rate, closed down small businesses, widening gap
between the rich and the poor, inability to pay for basic necessities and
spiralled inflation rise (Mather, 2013). 12% of Syrian farmers abandoned their
farms as there are increased in crop failure and loss of livestock (Jaridat
al-Watan, 2010). The Food and Agriculture Organization warned Syria faced
‘social destruction’ which led to the milieu of revolutionary fervour. The Arab
Spring emulation caused an unprecedented mass mobilisation of the Syrian people
against absolute anarchy. This had posited a realisation of political creative
chaos as a ‘revolutionary end game of the Middle East’ (Al-Sharif, 2011).
MULTIPLICITY OF POLITICAL ACTORS
The
multiplicity of external actors turns the crisis in vortex of multiple
conflicts and an arena of proxy wars between US and Russia superpowers. These
axis of opposing spectrums between the Assad regime and rebels as the
opposition proves it complexity. In the allegiance of the Assad regime consists
of Russia, Iran, Hezbollah and Shia militias. On the other hand, the rebels are
supported by Turkey, Gulf Arab states, United States and Jordan. In which both
parties carries out air strikes, provides political support at the UN, provides
arms, credit, military advisers and reportedly combat troops, provides
military, political support, money, weapons, training and logistical support
(Al-Jazeera, 2018). They fuel their own self-interests as they have personal
stake in the outcome of the war. For example, Syria historically sided with the
Soviet Union during the Cold War in which Russia has a naval base in Tartus,
Syria in 1971. There is also an airbase in Latakia in 2015 which is essential
for Russia to retain these substantive strategic assets to become a major
player in West Asia. While the Arab states place influence over Syria as a
foothold over the ‘Levant Quartet’ which is an agreement signed Turkey, Syria,
Lebanon and Jordan in 2010. This is hailed as the prospective “European Union
of the Middle East.” Another significant political actor is the Kurdish Syrian
whom faced discrimination by the government. Hence, they seek political
autonomy in their northern region habitant through the People’s Protection
Units (YPG), the US-funded militia. This causes Turkey to fear their
sovereignty as it interferes with the Turkish borders and arousing separatists’
movements. Furthermore, the increasing salience of hard-line Islam terrorist
groups with acts of violence such as Islamic State of Iraq Syria (ISIS) or
Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) or De’eesh. This justifies Assad’s ‘war
on terror’ in supposed to destroy ‘Islamic extremism’ while targeting
opposition groups. This justified fear of a future dysfunctional state and the
possibility of radical extremism wreaking wrath on Syria. Among the
philosophical disposition is the fatwas
by Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, based in Qatar which legitimizes the killings of
anyone who sides with the Syrian government (Gulf News/AFP 2013).
IDEOGRAM
The
ideogram is a tool to conceptually represent the ideological content that
exists in a society at a moment of history by simplifying multidimensional
issues through disaggregation and understanding the interconnectedness of the
dimensions measured. Christopher Phillips (2015) identified the postulated
Syrian ideological space spanning by eight dimensions: Syrian nationalism,
Sectarianism, Arab nationalism, Isolationism, Islamism, Universalism, Regionalism
and Subnationalism. A greater emphasis will be on Sectarianism as it is the
most relevant ideology in the Syrian society in this timeframe.
Syrian nationalism is the general
sense of belonging to the Syrian society and culture which believes Syrians
constitute a nation by themselves while Arab nationalism is the sense of
belonging to the Arab nation. Next, Islamism is the ideology from Islamic
principles while Universalism is the collection of religious and philosophical
concepts of universal applicability. Moreover, Regionalism aims at maximizing
interest in a region by creating alliances and subdivisions while
Subnationalism is the state of subdivision resulting from regional alignments.
Sectarianism is the disintegration
of common goals that provides sense of belonging to a country in favour of
sense of belonging to the sect. The narrative of heterogenous Syrians divides
into politicised ethno-sectarian groups due to outbreak of the war. This primordial
‘ancient hatred’ is revived from the population composition of which there are
12% Alawite which is a Shia branch supporting their own privileged sect, 64%
Arab Sunni which are marginalised under the Assad regime, 10% Kurdish who
prefer neutrality, 9% Christians, 3% Druze, 1% Shia and 1% others. This
multiplicity of sect are contentious as each party antagonises the other
through expressions of sectarianism. To epitomize this, the Arab Sunni were
alleged victims while the regime claimed the massacre was a fabrications
perpetrated by the opposition or radical Jihadist. There were also claims of
sexual violence of the Shabiha thug militia against Sunni women in Homs. Both
sides claimed sectarian kidnappings and looting property. For example, In Homs,
goods from Sunni homes were sold in Alawi neighbourhood gloatingly called
“Sunni market.” While in Idleb, the fleeing homes of Alawis were distributed to
Sunni families, churches and Shia mosques were attacked. This sectarian shadow
lingers as the protestors chanted their inclusive slogan “Christians to Beirut,
Alawis to the grave and Sunni blood is one.”
JUST WAR THEORY
Gerard
Powers (2012) analysed the Syrian crisis through the lens of Just War Theory.
In which realists views that war is necessary Syria epitomizes of St.
Augustine’s classic case for a just war in which love of neighbour permits the
use of force to protect the innocent. According to Pope
John Paul II, the international community has a duty to intervene to
"disarm the aggressor" when "the survival of populations and
entire ethnic groups is seriously compromised" aligning with the
international law concept of a responsibility to protect (R2P). According to Powers, while military
intervention in Syria would be “relatively easy; building a more stable, just
and peaceful Syria would not.” Realists argue war is necessary and must
be governed by moral norms and for national security interests.
Just war norms are divided into two sets of criteria which are Jus ad bellum and Jus in bello. The former answers the question of when and why it
is legitimate to initiate war. The preconditions includes the need for just
cause or right intention such as defence against aggression, must be decided by
legitimate authority, there is reasonable probability of success, the
destruction from war is proportionate to the good achieved and force is a last
resort after peaceful alternatives. In Jus
in bello, answers the question of how one conducts war. In which
non-combatants are not direct targets and collateral damage must not be
disproportionate.
However, the ills of just war analysis
includes incomplete, excessively permissive and unconnected to a peacebuilding
ethic. Firstly, in incomplete, the just war criteria of a just cause and last
resort must be met to justify humanitarian intervention. The issue of right
intention arises where there is “humanitarian war” cloaks ulterior motives of
imperialism and violation of state sovereignty. For example, the stakes Sunni
Arab states have on Syria may influence the convenient pretext for the pursuit
of providing aid for own political agendas. Hence, the criteria of legitimate
authority is significant to allow the overriding of norms of sovereignty and non-intervention.
This is done so by the authorization of UN Security Council to legitimate
intervention, mitigate risks of abuse of self-interest states and increase
difficulty of intervention. However, this international body is incapacitated
by Russia and China’s veto. Conversely, the Arab League could provide
authorization but is deemed questionable.
Next, in permissive, just war is restrictive as
there is limited use in military intervention yet humanitarian intervention
advocates are tempted to embrace permissive war ethic. In contrast, this
approach is sceptical of the efficacy of military intervention, especially for
humanitarian ends. According to Clausewitz, humanitarian intervention is a tool
in protecting human rights and maintain stability. The foreseeable consequences
of this intervention must be realistically analysed on whether it protects the
civilians or is there a better successor of the regime. For example, the Libyan
military intervention succeed in establishing safe havens, but it replaced the
previous regime with a worse off dictator, Mohammed Gaddafi.
Furthermore, there is the unconnected peacebuilding
in which R2P intended to refocus debate from military interventions to
developing capacities to meet obligations of their own citizens. However, this
criterion is neglected by military intervention advocates in Syria which are
the relationship between ethic of intervention and ethic of peacebuilding. A
restrictive just war ethic permits limited, non-military, multi-lateral
humanitarian intervention, conflict prevention, conflict management and
post-conflict reconciliation. In understanding the root causes of these
conflicts, there must be a tie between ethic and international effort in
analysing just war analysis to support democratic, political and economic
orders.
Thus, there is no best-case scenario from the Arab
Spring similar to Syria’s current situation. Regardless of the criticism, the
just war theory sets a theoretical framework in vigorous interventions on
peacebuilding strategy towards the prolonged civil war. Hence, rebuilding
broken societies.
SYRIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL
In
2011, The Syrian National Council was formed in Istanbul from coalition of
seven opposition factions and has a ‘military bureau’ such as liaising with the
Free Syrian Army. It is an independent group personifying sovereignty of the
Syrian people and their struggle for liberty. The SNC Charter enshrines a list
of human rights, judicial independence, press freedom, democracy and political
pluralism among its guiding principle (BBC News, 2011). The western leaders
such as William Hague during the Friends of Syria summit in Tunisia in 2012
recognizes SNC as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people and often
referred to as the government in waiting. Its overall strategy for armed
resistance best serve the Syrian Revolution by maintaining peace and stability after
the fall of the Assad regime (Mather, 2013). This safe political transition
offers commitment in securing financial stability and safeguards the nation
against chaos and infiltrators who attempt to cause instability. SNC claimed
that “the sooner this transition takes place, the greater chance of averting a
lengthy and sectarian civil war.” However, in the geopolitical realignment and
surrendering power to new leadership, most rebellious Syrians had turned to
anarchists (Khashanah, 2014).
MEDIATION
Mediation
has been pervasively used for conflict resolution during the Arab Spring ever
since its eruption that penetrated the Middle East. Syria has been the most
internalised global repercussion, arena of confrontation between former
superpowers, venue for neighbouring countries to pursue their regional
ambitions, and a grave partition along sectarian lines. The Assad regime is the
most resilient authority against the backdrop of conflicting interests.
However, there are mediation attempts by different actors including Turkey,
Qatar, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH),
Turkish NGO, regional and international initiatives such as Arab League and
United Nations (UN). International actors play a role in diminishing the
conflict as stated by the director of Syrian Institute Valerie Szybala that
“peace in Syria depends in a tremendous amount on the international actors.” According
to Frei (1976), through the dichotomous lens of success or failure of this
initiative, a success criterion is when both conflicting parties agree to
accept a mediator and a meditative attempt ensues within five days. Among the
historic mediation attempts to reduce the level of conflict intensity includes
the initiative by Turkey, Qatar and IHH in mediating the swap of 2130 Syrians
and 48 Iranian hostages, marking the biggest prisoner swap since World War II
(Sahin, 2015). Hence, these negotiations unite international actors, enabling
temporary ceasefire and resolving hostage crises but is unable to bring about
broader peace. The Syrian talks demonstrated gruesome effects that disagreement
among international actors and conflicting interests. The fore of limitations
of mediation is due to lack of coordination efforts and commitment, lack of
neutrality and inclusiveness as well as problems of representation and
legitimacy as major powers are interested peace only when they have a stake in
such end (Akpinar, 2016). Though its inability to bring about full settlement,
one can be optimistic on the on-going Geneva process as the Syrian government
expressed its willingness to continue intra-Syrian negotiations for
achievements such as long ceasefires, access to majority of besieged areas,
considerable de-escalation of violence and commitment of major actors towards
resolution (Reuters, 2016).
SAFE ZONES
Among
other notable viable peace process includes safe zones. These safe zones were
said by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to allow Syrian refugees to return to
their war-torn country. However, the Turkish officials merely provide vague
details where the zones would be located and how they would be administered as
it was likely the placement of these refugees is at the northern Syria under
nominal Turkish control. This decision is due to the building tensions between
locals and Syrians who compete for jobs and resources as Turkey faces
recession. However, the president of the Ankara-based Research Centre on Asylum
and Migration, Metin Corabatir stated his concern of the feasibility of
returning Syrians to a war zone as the areas are not conducive for civilians.
This doubt in plans to resettle refugees could also violate international law
as sending refugees back to war zones - known as refoulement - is prohibited.
Therefore, there any security solution should have an internationally agreement
established (Wilks, 2019).
UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION
In
accordance to Article 10 and 14 of the UN Charter, the General Assembly
resolutions are recommendations that is stressed by the International Court of
Justice. This UN resolution is a formal text issued by the Security Council or
General Assembly in which Article 25 stipulates that UN members are bound to
carry out this decision. In the course of years of conflict, myriad of
resolutions were formed to address the Syrian civil war. The most recent is the
UN Resolution 2401 in 2018 which demanded an immediate 30-day ceasefire to allow
humanitarian access to multiple parts of Syria, in particular the war-ravaged
Eastern Ghouta and Yarmouk suburbs of Damascus, as well as Al-Fu’ah and Kafriya
in the Idlib governorate (Michek, 2018). It also urges relevant parties to work
towards implementing the more substantive and wide-ranging ceasefire proposed
in Resolution 2268 passed in February 2016, and to allow the evacuation of
civilians wishing to leave.
Every single organization engaging in combat in Syria
is required by the resolution to implement the ceasefire. This includes
pro-Assad rebel groups, Assad’s government forces, Kurdish rebel groups and
government forces, like those of Turkey and Russia, currently engaged in
conflict within Syria. However, this is not covered by the ceasefire in
combating operations against the Islamic State, al-Qaeda, al-Nusra and any
affiliated group as designated by the U.N. Security Council.
Absent the application of greater external pressure,
the situation is unlikely to improve until Assad wins a decisive victory in
Ghouta and much of Idlib. In the meantime, Der-ez-Zor and Afrin will also
remain flashpoints for escalating conflict between the external powers that
have turned Syria’s civil war into their own. In short, so long as Washington
continues to support U.N. ceasefires while expecting Assad to comply in good
faith and refusing to criticize violations by allies, Syria’s civil war will go
on at great cost to both civilians and U.S. interests.
CONCLUSION
The Syrian Civil War in its historic background has
met with complexities and led to dire straits to which some scholars have came
to the question: is the price of freedom worth the toll on peace? This crisis
is interpreted through the theoretical framework to predict the likely outcome
of the war based on current and past events of the crisis itself as well as the
results of other countries engaged in the Arab Spring.
In pursuit of regime change, Syria’s geopolitical
realignment has brought adverse impacts which some believe that the Arab Spring
led to a precipitous crossroad, a breaking point from reaching permanent status
of peace. These revolutionary aspirations are further complicated by opportunist
scavengers masked by external political actors that have a stake in the outcome
of the war. “The international community has failed,” stated by Daniel Neep,
assistant professor at the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies in Georgetown
as growing tensions and futile peace process ensued in failure. In which
concludes that these conflicting parties should stop forthwith from deepening
the wounds of different ideologies and resume negotiation efforts. This is
because the coherence of efforts are likely to coalesce into a permanent
peaceful settlement and allow the reconstruction of war-torn Syria. In Atlantic
Council’s “Rebuilding Syria” project, among the recovery efforts that should be
considered includes rebuilding housing and urban infrastructure as well as
advises private and government clients on dynamics in the Levant (Bode, 2017).
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