Discussion on the Syrian Crisis

The swift downfall of dictators in Egypt and Tunisia sparked neighbouring countries to emulate the Arab Spring regime change. Consequently, Syria’s 2011 peaceful protests met with the brutal crackdown of the Assad regime which is considered as the genesis of the Syrian civil war. However, the dynamic of the crisis is further complicated by external actors and ideological as well as geographical diagrams. In this body of discussion, there is an attempt to resolve the crisis and convene a viable peace process.

The crisis heavily impacts human rights as it births heinous crimes, terrorist acts, oppression, torture, deception, manipulations, targeted misinformation, casualties, displacement and intentional humiliation (Weaver, 2013). This also has spill over effect impacting beyond national borders into the most vulnerable neighbouring country through porous borders, Lebanon and its sunni and shia political factions (Mather, 2013).  

These are costs of revolutionary aspirations in overthrowing an oppressive government. The observable revolutionary trends have three distinct stages which are politicize, radicalize and militarize (Khashanah, 2014). The basic and common ingredients that induce revolt are poverty, illiteracy, injustice, corruption and tyranny. In the case of Syria, the uprising is due to discontent that begun with poor climatic conditions, drought, high crude oil prices, food shortages, high unemployment rate, closed down small businesses, widening gap between the rich and the poor, inability to pay for basic necessities and spiralled inflation rise (Mather, 2013). 12% of Syrian farmers abandoned their farms as there are increased in crop failure and loss of livestock (Jaridat al-Watan, 2010). The Food and Agriculture Organization warned Syria faced ‘social destruction’ which led to the milieu of revolutionary fervour. The Arab Spring emulation caused an unprecedented mass mobilisation of the Syrian people against absolute anarchy. This had posited a realisation of political creative chaos as a ‘revolutionary end game of the Middle East’ (Al-Sharif, 2011).

MULTIPLICITY OF POLITICAL ACTORS

The multiplicity of external actors turns the crisis in vortex of multiple conflicts and an arena of proxy wars between US and Russia superpowers. These axis of opposing spectrums between the Assad regime and rebels as the opposition proves it complexity. In the allegiance of the Assad regime consists of Russia, Iran, Hezbollah and Shia militias. On the other hand, the rebels are supported by Turkey, Gulf Arab states, United States and Jordan. In which both parties carries out air strikes, provides political support at the UN, provides arms, credit, military advisers and reportedly combat troops, provides military, political support, money, weapons, training and logistical support (Al-Jazeera, 2018). They fuel their own self-interests as they have personal stake in the outcome of the war. For example, Syria historically sided with the Soviet Union during the Cold War in which Russia has a naval base in Tartus, Syria in 1971. There is also an airbase in Latakia in 2015 which is essential for Russia to retain these substantive strategic assets to become a major player in West Asia. While the Arab states place influence over Syria as a foothold over the ‘Levant Quartet’ which is an agreement signed Turkey, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan in 2010. This is hailed as the prospective “European Union of the Middle East.” Another significant political actor is the Kurdish Syrian whom faced discrimination by the government. Hence, they seek political autonomy in their northern region habitant through the People’s Protection Units (YPG), the US-funded militia. This causes Turkey to fear their sovereignty as it interferes with the Turkish borders and arousing separatists’ movements. Furthermore, the increasing salience of hard-line Islam terrorist groups with acts of violence such as Islamic State of Iraq Syria (ISIS) or Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) or De’eesh. This justifies Assad’s ‘war on terror’ in supposed to destroy ‘Islamic extremism’ while targeting opposition groups. This justified fear of a future dysfunctional state and the possibility of radical extremism wreaking wrath on Syria. Among the philosophical disposition is the fatwas by Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, based in Qatar which legitimizes the killings of anyone who sides with the Syrian government (Gulf News/AFP 2013).

IDEOGRAM

The ideogram is a tool to conceptually represent the ideological content that exists in a society at a moment of history by simplifying multidimensional issues through disaggregation and understanding the interconnectedness of the dimensions measured. Christopher Phillips (2015) identified the postulated Syrian ideological space spanning by eight dimensions: Syrian nationalism, Sectarianism, Arab nationalism, Isolationism, Islamism, Universalism, Regionalism and Subnationalism. A greater emphasis will be on Sectarianism as it is the most relevant ideology in the Syrian society in this timeframe.

            Syrian nationalism is the general sense of belonging to the Syrian society and culture which believes Syrians constitute a nation by themselves while Arab nationalism is the sense of belonging to the Arab nation. Next, Islamism is the ideology from Islamic principles while Universalism is the collection of religious and philosophical concepts of universal applicability. Moreover, Regionalism aims at maximizing interest in a region by creating alliances and subdivisions while Subnationalism is the state of subdivision resulting from regional alignments.

            Sectarianism is the disintegration of common goals that provides sense of belonging to a country in favour of sense of belonging to the sect. The narrative of heterogenous Syrians divides into politicised ethno-sectarian groups due to outbreak of the war. This primordial ‘ancient hatred’ is revived from the population composition of which there are 12% Alawite which is a Shia branch supporting their own privileged sect, 64% Arab Sunni which are marginalised under the Assad regime, 10% Kurdish who prefer neutrality, 9% Christians, 3% Druze, 1% Shia and 1% others. This multiplicity of sect are contentious as each party antagonises the other through expressions of sectarianism. To epitomize this, the Arab Sunni were alleged victims while the regime claimed the massacre was a fabrications perpetrated by the opposition or radical Jihadist. There were also claims of sexual violence of the Shabiha thug militia against Sunni women in Homs. Both sides claimed sectarian kidnappings and looting property. For example, In Homs, goods from Sunni homes were sold in Alawi neighbourhood gloatingly called “Sunni market.” While in Idleb, the fleeing homes of Alawis were distributed to Sunni families, churches and Shia mosques were attacked. This sectarian shadow lingers as the protestors chanted their inclusive slogan “Christians to Beirut, Alawis to the grave and Sunni blood is one.”

JUST WAR THEORY

Gerard Powers (2012) analysed the Syrian crisis through the lens of Just War Theory. In which realists views that war is necessary Syria epitomizes of St. Augustine’s classic case for a just war in which love of neighbour permits the use of force to protect the innocent. According to Pope John Paul II, the international community has a duty to intervene to "disarm the aggressor" when "the survival of populations and entire ethnic groups is seriously compromised" aligning with the international law concept of a responsibility to protect (R2P). According to Powers, while military intervention in Syria would be “relatively easy; building a more stable, just and peaceful Syria would not.” Realists argue war is necessary and must be governed by moral norms and for national security interests.

Just war norms are divided into two sets of criteria which are Jus ad bellum and Jus in bello. The former answers the question of when and why it is legitimate to initiate war. The preconditions includes the need for just cause or right intention such as defence against aggression, must be decided by legitimate authority, there is reasonable probability of success, the destruction from war is proportionate to the good achieved and force is a last resort after peaceful alternatives. In Jus in bello, answers the question of how one conducts war. In which non-combatants are not direct targets and collateral damage must not be disproportionate.

However, the ills of just war analysis includes incomplete, excessively permissive and unconnected to a peacebuilding ethic. Firstly, in incomplete, the just war criteria of a just cause and last resort must be met to justify humanitarian intervention. The issue of right intention arises where there is “humanitarian war” cloaks ulterior motives of imperialism and violation of state sovereignty. For example, the stakes Sunni Arab states have on Syria may influence the convenient pretext for the pursuit of providing aid for own political agendas. Hence, the criteria of legitimate authority is significant to allow the overriding of norms of sovereignty and non-intervention. This is done so by the authorization of UN Security Council to legitimate intervention, mitigate risks of abuse of self-interest states and increase difficulty of intervention. However, this international body is incapacitated by Russia and China’s veto. Conversely, the Arab League could provide authorization but is deemed questionable.

Next, in permissive, just war is restrictive as there is limited use in military intervention yet humanitarian intervention advocates are tempted to embrace permissive war ethic. In contrast, this approach is sceptical of the efficacy of military intervention, especially for humanitarian ends. According to Clausewitz, humanitarian intervention is a tool in protecting human rights and maintain stability. The foreseeable consequences of this intervention must be realistically analysed on whether it protects the civilians or is there a better successor of the regime. For example, the Libyan military intervention succeed in establishing safe havens, but it replaced the previous regime with a worse off dictator, Mohammed Gaddafi.

Furthermore, there is the unconnected peacebuilding in which R2P intended to refocus debate from military interventions to developing capacities to meet obligations of their own citizens. However, this criterion is neglected by military intervention advocates in Syria which are the relationship between ethic of intervention and ethic of peacebuilding. A restrictive just war ethic permits limited, non-military, multi-lateral humanitarian intervention, conflict prevention, conflict management and post-conflict reconciliation. In understanding the root causes of these conflicts, there must be a tie between ethic and international effort in analysing just war analysis to support democratic, political and economic orders.

Thus, there is no best-case scenario from the Arab Spring similar to Syria’s current situation. Regardless of the criticism, the just war theory sets a theoretical framework in vigorous interventions on peacebuilding strategy towards the prolonged civil war. Hence, rebuilding broken societies.

SYRIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL

In 2011, The Syrian National Council was formed in Istanbul from coalition of seven opposition factions and has a ‘military bureau’ such as liaising with the Free Syrian Army. It is an independent group personifying sovereignty of the Syrian people and their struggle for liberty. The SNC Charter enshrines a list of human rights, judicial independence, press freedom, democracy and political pluralism among its guiding principle (BBC News, 2011). The western leaders such as William Hague during the Friends of Syria summit in Tunisia in 2012 recognizes SNC as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people and often referred to as the government in waiting. Its overall strategy for armed resistance best serve the Syrian Revolution by maintaining peace and stability after the fall of the Assad regime (Mather, 2013). This safe political transition offers commitment in securing financial stability and safeguards the nation against chaos and infiltrators who attempt to cause instability. SNC claimed that “the sooner this transition takes place, the greater chance of averting a lengthy and sectarian civil war.” However, in the geopolitical realignment and surrendering power to new leadership, most rebellious Syrians had turned to anarchists (Khashanah, 2014).

MEDIATION

Mediation has been pervasively used for conflict resolution during the Arab Spring ever since its eruption that penetrated the Middle East. Syria has been the most internalised global repercussion, arena of confrontation between former superpowers, venue for neighbouring countries to pursue their regional ambitions, and a grave partition along sectarian lines. The Assad regime is the most resilient authority against the backdrop of conflicting interests. However, there are mediation attempts by different actors including Turkey, Qatar, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH), Turkish NGO, regional and international initiatives such as Arab League and United Nations (UN). International actors play a role in diminishing the conflict as stated by the director of Syrian Institute Valerie Szybala that “peace in Syria depends in a tremendous amount on the international actors.” According to Frei (1976), through the dichotomous lens of success or failure of this initiative, a success criterion is when both conflicting parties agree to accept a mediator and a meditative attempt ensues within five days. Among the historic mediation attempts to reduce the level of conflict intensity includes the initiative by Turkey, Qatar and IHH in mediating the swap of 2130 Syrians and 48 Iranian hostages, marking the biggest prisoner swap since World War II (Sahin, 2015). Hence, these negotiations unite international actors, enabling temporary ceasefire and resolving hostage crises but is unable to bring about broader peace. The Syrian talks demonstrated gruesome effects that disagreement among international actors and conflicting interests. The fore of limitations of mediation is due to lack of coordination efforts and commitment, lack of neutrality and inclusiveness as well as problems of representation and legitimacy as major powers are interested peace only when they have a stake in such end (Akpinar, 2016). Though its inability to bring about full settlement, one can be optimistic on the on-going Geneva process as the Syrian government expressed its willingness to continue intra-Syrian negotiations for achievements such as long ceasefires, access to majority of besieged areas, considerable de-escalation of violence and commitment of major actors towards resolution (Reuters, 2016).

SAFE ZONES

Among other notable viable peace process includes safe zones. These safe zones were said by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to allow Syrian refugees to return to their war-torn country. However, the Turkish officials merely provide vague details where the zones would be located and how they would be administered as it was likely the placement of these refugees is at the northern Syria under nominal Turkish control. This decision is due to the building tensions between locals and Syrians who compete for jobs and resources as Turkey faces recession. However, the president of the Ankara-based Research Centre on Asylum and Migration, Metin Corabatir stated his concern of the feasibility of returning Syrians to a war zone as the areas are not conducive for civilians. This doubt in plans to resettle refugees could also violate international law as sending refugees back to war zones - known as refoulement - is prohibited. Therefore, there any security solution should have an internationally agreement established (Wilks, 2019).

UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION

In accordance to Article 10 and 14 of the UN Charter, the General Assembly resolutions are recommendations that is stressed by the International Court of Justice. This UN resolution is a formal text issued by the Security Council or General Assembly in which Article 25 stipulates that UN members are bound to carry out this decision. In the course of years of conflict, myriad of resolutions were formed to address the Syrian civil war. The most recent is the UN Resolution 2401 in 2018 which demanded an immediate 30-day ceasefire to allow humanitarian access to multiple parts of Syria, in particular the war-ravaged Eastern Ghouta and Yarmouk suburbs of Damascus, as well as Al-Fu’ah and Kafriya in the Idlib governorate (Michek, 2018). It also urges relevant parties to work towards implementing the more substantive and wide-ranging ceasefire proposed in Resolution 2268 passed in February 2016, and to allow the evacuation of civilians wishing to leave.

Every single organization engaging in combat in Syria is required by the resolution to implement the ceasefire. This includes pro-Assad rebel groups, Assad’s government forces, Kurdish rebel groups and government forces, like those of Turkey and Russia, currently engaged in conflict within Syria. However, this is not covered by the ceasefire in combating operations against the Islamic State, al-Qaeda, al-Nusra and any affiliated group as designated by the U.N. Security Council.

Absent the application of greater external pressure, the situation is unlikely to improve until Assad wins a decisive victory in Ghouta and much of Idlib. In the meantime, Der-ez-Zor and Afrin will also remain flashpoints for escalating conflict between the external powers that have turned Syria’s civil war into their own. In short, so long as Washington continues to support U.N. ceasefires while expecting Assad to comply in good faith and refusing to criticize violations by allies, Syria’s civil war will go on at great cost to both civilians and U.S. interests.

CONCLUSION

The Syrian Civil War in its historic background has met with complexities and led to dire straits to which some scholars have came to the question: is the price of freedom worth the toll on peace? This crisis is interpreted through the theoretical framework to predict the likely outcome of the war based on current and past events of the crisis itself as well as the results of other countries engaged in the Arab Spring.

In pursuit of regime change, Syria’s geopolitical realignment has brought adverse impacts which some believe that the Arab Spring led to a precipitous crossroad, a breaking point from reaching permanent status of peace. These revolutionary aspirations are further complicated by opportunist scavengers masked by external political actors that have a stake in the outcome of the war. “The international community has failed,” stated by Daniel Neep, assistant professor at the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies in Georgetown as growing tensions and futile peace process ensued in failure. In which concludes that these conflicting parties should stop forthwith from deepening the wounds of different ideologies and resume negotiation efforts. This is because the coherence of efforts are likely to coalesce into a permanent peaceful settlement and allow the reconstruction of war-torn Syria. In Atlantic Council’s “Rebuilding Syria” project, among the recovery efforts that should be considered includes rebuilding housing and urban infrastructure as well as advises private and government clients on dynamics in the Levant (Bode, 2017).

REFERENCES

Al-Jazeera. (2018, April 14). Retrieved from Syria's civil war explained from the beginning:

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/05/syria-civil-war-explained-

160505084119966.html

BBC News. (2019, February 25). Retrieved from Why is there a war in Syria?:

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35806229

Chris Huber, K. R. (2019, March 15). World Vision. Retrieved from Syrian refugee crisis:

Facts, FAQs and how to help: https://www.worldvision.org/refugees-news-

stories/syrian-refugee-crisis-facts

Christopher Phillips (2015) Sectarianism and conflict in Syria, Third World Quarterly, 36:2,

357-376, DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2015.1015788

Chulov, Martin, and Ian Black. 2013. “Syria: Jordan to Spearhead Saudi Arabian Arms

Drive.”The Guardian April 14. Accessed October 3, 2013.http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013apr/14/syria-jordan-spearhead-saudi-arms-drive

Doherty, Regan and Rania El Gamal. 2012. “Syria National Coalition negotiations:

Opposition groups consider forming U.S.-backed Assembly” Huffington Post, October 11. Accesse October 2, 2013. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/10/syrian-national-coalitionnegotiations_n_2111629.html

Foreign Policy. 2011. “Responsibility to Protect.” Foreign Policy November. Accessed

October 2, 2013. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/responsibility_to_protect_a_

short_history

Gaouette, Nicole, and Massoud Derhally. 2011. “Assad has ‘Lost Legitimacy’, Clinton Says.”

Bloomberg July 12. Accessed October 2, 2013. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-

11/clinton-says-assad-lost-legitimacy-after-mob-attacks-embassy.html

Heydemann, Steven. 2012. “Managing Militarization in Syria.” Foreign Policy/Middle East

Channel February 22. Accessed October 3, 2013. http://mideastafrica.foreignpolicy.com/

posts/2012/02/22/managing_militarization_in_syria#sthash.mtk1HBzD.dpbs

Internal Displament Monitoring Centre. (n.d.). Retrieved from Syria: http://www.internal-

displacement.org/countries/Syria

Kessler, Glenn. 2011. “Hillary Clinton’s Uncredible Statement on Syria.” Washington Post

Fact-checker, April 4. Accessed October 2, 2013. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/

fact-checker/post/hillary-clintons-uncredible-statement-on syria/2011/04/01/AFWPEYaC_blog.html

Kissinger, Henry. 2012. “Syrian Intervention Risks Upsetting Global Order.” Washington Post

June 2. Accessed October 2, 2013. http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/syrianintervention-

risks-upsetting-global-order/2012/06/01/gJQA9fGr7U_story.html

Landis, Joshua. 2011. “Free Syrian Army Founded by Seven Officers to Fight the Syrian

Army.”Syria Comment 29 July. Accessed October 3, 2013. http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/freesyrian-army-established-to-fight-the-syrian-army/

Michel Kilo (2011) Syria … the road to where?, Contemporary Arab Affairs, 4:4, 431-444

Naharnet Newsdesk. 2012. “Lavrov Accuses U.S. of ‘Justifying Terror’ in Syria.” Naharnet

Newsdesk July 25. Accessed October 2, 2013. http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/47777

Nikolay Kozhanov (2014) Russian-Syrian Dialogue: Myths and Realities, The Journal of the

Middle East and Africa, 5:1, 1-22, DOI: 10.1080/21520844.2014.883257

Obama, Barack. 2011. “Obama’s Speech on Libya: ‘A Responsibility to Act’.” National Public

Radio March 28. Accessed October 4, 2013. http://www.npr.org/2011/03/28/134935452/

obamas-speech-on-libya-a-responsibility-to-act

Pınar Akpınar (2016): The limits of mediation in the Arab Spring: the case of Syria, Third

World Quarterly, DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2016.1218273

Ranjit Gupta (2016) Understanding the War in Syria and the Roles of External Players: Way

Out of the Quagmire?, The Round Table, 105:1, 29-41, DOI:

10.1080/00358533.2016.1128630

Spencer, R. (2016, April 3). The Telegraph. Retrieved from Who are the Alawites?:

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/04/02/who-are-the-alawites/

United Nations HIgh Commissioner for Refugee. (n.d.). Retrieved from Internally Displaced

People: https://www.unhcr.org/sy/internally-displaced-people